The
rising impact of social media
By Bi Yantao ( China
Daily)
The recent
Israel-Palestine conflict has highlighted the importance of new media in a war.
On Nov 14, Israeli defense forces launched "Operation Pillar of
Defense" both on the traditional and virtual battlefields, with the
Palestinians fighting back on both fronts. It is thus more than evident that
social media have become the second front in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Warfare in the
information age has changed dramatically. Traditionally, media campaigns have
served only as a supplementary tool in a war. But today, the media play a
crucial role in influencing world opinion and winning support.
To win wars in the
information age, the United
States has explored and exploited all
possible options. In the Iraq War, the US army used an
"embedded" information control strategy, allowing more than 600
journalists from around the world to cover news along with the combat troops.
In fact, "embedded coverage" is a well-designed media experiment for
using the media to give the world the US military version of a war.
With the advances
made in information and communication technology, and given the popularity of
new media, political and military campaigns have widely used social media. Tunisia 's
"Jasmine Revolution" showed how important a role social media can
play in promoting political change. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, social
media have been weaponized, which should be seen as the result of the evolution
of warfare technology.
Because of its
special national conditions, Israel
has attached great importance to projecting its image since its foundation,
though initially it mainly focused on the state's religious significance for
Jews.
In 2005, with the
help of American marketing executives, Israel
launched "Brand Israel ",
a campaign to "rebrand" the country's image as "relevant and
modern" instead of militaristic and religious. Now, Israelis and
Palestinians both are trying to legitimize their policies and operations.
In October 2000,
the Palestinians and Israelis resorted to cyber warfare for the first time. One
year later, both sides extended the cyber war to the psychological and media
battlefields. Israel
said it was "disadvantaged" in this regard because of the lack of
collaboration between the media and the government and because it was not
well-prepared for a new type of war. Soon Israel established the National
Information Directorate to coordinate between the media and different wings of
the government, turning it into a platform for cooperation among all the
agencies that deal with communication relations and public diplomacy. This
automatically accorded social media a special status.
In December 2008, Israel 's
defense forces opened a military channel on YouTube. A year later, social media
began playing an important and distinct role in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. And in 2010, the Israeli Foreign Ministry spent $15 million for
research into and application of social media.
Apart from seeking
advice from US specialized agencies, the Israeli Foreign Ministry recruited
civil Web specialists to participate in a secret social media war. At the same
time, it encouraged patriotic personalities to help the government reshape the
image of the country. These non-military, non-governmental Web specialists used
the garb of ordinary Internet users to help project Israel 's new image. Besides, the
Israeli Foreign Ministry has also distributed a large number of pro-Israel
photographs and videos among its citizens on the understanding that they would
post them online.
The US is Israel 's
preferred target market to exert influence, followed by Russia and Europe .
But Israelis and Palestinians have now opened a "battlefield" on China 's
twitter-like website of weibo, too. Israel is making greater efforts,
though, to influence the movers and shakers across the world.
Through various
new media platforms, such as Twitter, YouTube, Facebook and Flickr, Israelis
and Palestinians are trying to influence public narrative by providing
"facts" to their respective liking. However, these media operations
are part of a propaganda war, which mixes unverified network information with
lies, slander, deceit and intimidation to manipulate people's perceptions.
Social media are
inexpensive and easily accessible, and can be used by anyone to publish
anything. Compared with the traditional media, social media are more
decentralized, less hierarchical, and distinguished by multiple points of
production and utility. In the foreseeable future, all wars will be accompanied
by media wars to cover each period and corner.
Like traditional
warfare, social media war also has strategic, campaign and tactical goals. So
it should be evaluated according to different timings and events. But a social
media war is a protracted war that demands constant resources and weapons.
Otherwise, it will not produce the desired result.
In the public
opinion war, Israelis have gained an upper hand because of their preparedness
and proper strategies and tactics. In the war to gain the international
community's support, a government must play an absolutely dominant role - it
cannot expect to win a media war by being overly dependent on spontaneous civic
actions.
The media war will
continue as long as there are conflicts of interests between countries. China ,
too, faces opportunities and challenges in the age of information technology,
and has to strengthen its communication capabilities and upgrade its concepts
and models to communicate with the rest of the world.
In 2006, former US
president George W. Bush coined the term, "kinetic action", which is
a euphemism for "use of force". After that, "non-kinetic
operation" began to appear frequently in US military files. To me,
"non-kinetic power" means the strength to persuade, allure and coerce
targeted countries (or organizations) to cooperate with the US . Therefore, China should make "non-kinetic
action" an important part of its foreign operations.
The author is
director of the Center for Communication Studies, Hainan University .
(China Daily NOV 30,
2012, page 9)